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own holdings and change the law if the conditions so warrant. Further-
more, this minimal interference is unavoidable so long as the United
States is organized on federal principles. Even if diversity jurisdiction
were abolished, a similar type of "interference with state autonomy" would
still exist when, under conflict of laws rules, the policies of one state gov-
erned litigation occurring in another state. Consequently, although it is
true that for each diversity case decided in a federal court the state's judi-
cial power may not be coextensive with its legislative power, the lack of co-
extensiveness seems to be neither substantial nor harmful. If diversity
jurisdiction is to be abolished or changed, it should not be done because of
interference with state autonomy, at least as far as state litigation is
concerned.
The ALT proposal to limit diversity jurisdiction is but one of many
that have been offered and accepted or rejected. Any decision by Con-
gress to change or not to change diversity jurisdiction will affect the
functioning and the "scope and limits" of the federal judiciary; and this
in turn will undoubtedly affect the "happy relation" of states to nation,
which is not only our "abiding political problem" but is also the basis of
our federal system." 4 In view of this result of such a change, it is sug-
gested that the reasons underlying it should be the subject of special
scrutiny. The study presented in this note suggests that the ALI appre-
hension regarding the effect of present diversity jurisdiction on state
autonomy is perhaps unwarranted. Therefore, unless other conditions
justify the proposed revision of diversity jurisdiction it seems that its
suggested redistribution of judicial power might accomplish an un-
intended and unanticipated result.
APPENDIX: STATISTICAL ANALYSES OF DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION
I. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STATE AND FEDERAL CASE LOADS
The American Law Institute contends that the federal courts are in-
terfering with state court autonomy through the exercise of diversity
jurisdiction. While the nature of this interference is never specified, one
possibility is that a significant interference would result if the federal
court subsequently changes its view of the law, there is a new conflict. And as to this,
"Conflict with the past is to be preferred over conflict with the future." Id. at 776.
114. Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 500 (1928).
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courts were deciding the bulk of cases in any given area of substantive
law, thereby leaving the state courts no real role in creating state rules to
govern these areas. Determining whether this situation exists is the
specific purpose of this analysis. In addition, a study was made of the
comparative nature of the parties in the state and federal courts. Thus,
the question to be answered was, are the federal courts significantly pre-
ferred over the state courts for certain causes of action and by certain
parties ?
A. Methodology.
The material for this analysis was obtained by collecting all diversity
cases reported in the Seventh Circuit since the Erie decision in 1938.1
These cases were classified as to type of party involved, cause of action,
and legal issue-that is, factual, statutory, or common law. (Diversity
cases in which the sole issue was the jurisdiction of the federal court
were omitted.)
In order to compare the federal cases with those in the states, the
state reporters for the states in the Seventh Circuit-Illinois, Indiana, and
Wisconsin-were studied and similarly classified.2
In this investigation, certain policies of classification were followed.
When tabulating the parties, partnerships and unincorporated associations
were classified as multi-party individuals. Cases in which both a cor-
poration and its officers were joined were classified as mixed party
cases. In classifying the causes of action, infrequent situations of in-
tentional infliction of injury were included in the negligence categories.
All cases involving both personal injury and property damage were clas-
sified only as personal injury actions. The automobile classifications in-
clude trucks and buses as well. Cases involving collisions between trains
and motor vehicles were classified as railroad causes of action since in all
these cases the railroad company was named as a party defendant. The
tort-contract dichotomy of a warranty action was resolved in favor of
an entry in the negligence categories. Classified as real estate contract
causes of action were cases concerning mortgages, mineral, oil, and other
1. It may be objected that using only reported cases does not give an accurate pic-
ture of the diversity business done in the federal courts. However, for the main pur-
poses of comparison in this study, it was felt that any discrepancies caused by failure
to consider non-reported cases in the federal courts would be counteracted by the similar
treatment given to state cases.
2. State reports searched were Illinois Supreme and Appellate Court reports, Janu-
ary 1958 to December 1958; Indiana Supreme and Appellate Court reports, May 1958 to
April 1963; Wisconsin Supreme Court reports, January 1958 to June 1959. The time
periods covered by the state search were chosen so that the respective state courts each
decided approximately the same total number of cases involving causes of action similar to
those found in federal diversity cases.
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leases, mechanic's liens, and contracts for the sale of land but not broker's
contracts. The classification "other contracts" includes contracts for
services, negotiable instruments, real estate broker's contracts, and em-
ployment contracts. The classification "other causes of action" includes
cases of fraud, deceit, libel, slander, false imprisonment, and other ac-
tions not included elsewhere. In both federal and state tabulations, a case
was tabulated only upon its first appearance and not upon subsequent ap-
pearances, if it was later appealed.
B. Results.
The general finding of this study is that there is no area of substan-
tive law in which the federal courts are pre-empting the law-making func-
tions of the state courts, whether comparison is made on a numerical or
percentage basis. The following graph (see page 589) shows the number
of state and federal cases falling into each of the substantive categories
each year. The state court reported decisions greatly outnumbered the
federal decisions in every category and for each state. Moreover, the total
reported state cases dealing with these causes of action outnumbered, on a
yearly average, the federal diversity decisions by 458 to 58. This means
that of the total reported decisions rendered in one year by both state and
federal courts on questions of "state law" which arise in diversity cases,
less than eleven per cent of those decisions are rendered by federal courts.
Table 1 shows the relationship of each substantive category to the
case loads of the respective courts.' It will be noted that cases arising in
the state courts involving issues similar to those which were found in the
diversity cases represent only a fraction of the total state case load. When
it is recalled that the federal decisions accounted for less than eleven per
cent of the total cases involving "diversity questions," it becomes appar-
ent that in exercising diversity jurisdiction the federal courts are deciding
an extremely small number of cases involving "state law," as compared
to the decisions of the state courts.4 One is led to inquire exactly what
kind of "interference with state autonomy" is felt to be undesirable in the
light of these conditions.
Even though the federal courts decide cases which could be decided
by state courts, to the extent that these cases involve only factual disputes,
the federal courts are not interfering greatly with the orderly creation and
3. Percentages in this breakdown do not total 100 because of the large number of
"other" causes of action which did not recur frequently enough to warrant a separate
category.
4. Compare in this regard the estimate of the A.L.I. that their proposals will in-
crease state court case loads by only 1.6%, as discussed in note 20 infra and accom-
panying text.
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TABLE 1: Substantive Causes of Action as Percentage of Court Case Load
Court: Cause of Action Percent of Diversity Cases
United States Court of Appeals insurance contracts 17
for the '"other" contracts (not insurance, sales, or real
Seventh Circuit estate contracts) 16
personal injury, auto 12
personal injury, railroad 6
"other" personal injury from negligence (not
auto or railroad) 10
real estate contracts (leases, sale of land con-
tracts, mortgages, etc.) 5
sales contracts 4
United States District Courts insurance contracts 15
for the "other" contracts 13
Seventh Circuit "other" personal injury from negligence 13
personal injury, auto 12
sales contracts 5
real estate contracts 5
Per cent of Per cent of
States: Cause of Action Diversiy-like Total State
I Cases Cases
Illinois: "other" personal injury from negligence 20 8
"other" contracts 18 7
real estate contracts 16 6
personal injury, auto 13 5
insurance contracts 9 3
sales contracts 7 3
Indiana: personal injury, auto 23 4
"other" contracts 16 3
real estate contracts 14 3
"other" personal injury from negligence 12 2
employment contracts 9 2
insurance contracts 7 1
personal injury, railroad 7 1
"other" property damage from negligence 5 1
Wisconsin: personal injury, auto 36 19
real estate contracts 14 7
"other" personal injury from negligence 13 7
"other" contracts 10 5
insurance contracts 8 4
_ sales contracts 5 3
implementation of state policy. Cases in which the federal courts must
interpret state statutes raise the main possibility for policy conflict be-
tween federal and state courts. The study revealed that less than one-half
of the diversity cases in federal trial courts dealt with statutory issues (see
Table 2). In federal appellate courts, about one-third of the diversity
cases involved a statutory issue. Hence, it can be seen that federal courts
are dealing mainly with the application of the common law of the state
and the decision of factual issues rather than the interpretation of statutes
of the state.
Turning to the results shown in Table 3 regarding the kinds of parties
involved in diversity cases in the Seventh Circuit and similar cases in the
state courts of that circuit, it appears that the federal court is the forum
NOTES 591
TABLE 2: Types of Legal Issues in Federal Courts
Federal Court Number Percentage
Trial (F. Supp.) I
Fact 121 j 28
Statutory 209 49
Common Law 233 54
Total Cases 430*
Appellate (F.2d)
Fact 399 36
Statutory 371 34
Common Law 647 58
Total Cases 1107*
* Some cases involved more than one legal issue.
of the individual as plaintiff5 and the corporation as defendant. In the
state courts, the plaintiff is largely an individual, while the types of de-
fendants are varied. In every party classification, the percentage of in-
dividuals is greater in the state courts and the percentage of corporations
is greater in the federal courts.0
TABLE 3: Percentage Classification of Parties in State and Federal Courts
Plaintiff j Defendant
Single Multil
JI Gocn.v. I I jvov -
rr -Coro.j ecu- Pri. ICop- ecu-[ 1 Pi- (Corpo.[ ecu. Fri- ICorpo-! cr. i- d
veto [ration ment vate [ration Imerit IMAixed Ivats [rationlment -atsrto mntxe
Federal
Trial Courts
(F. Supp.) 48 28 1 16 3 0 3 13 139 17 13 13 1 16
Federal
Appellate
Courts
(F.2d) 53 20 1 14 2 0 3 13 53 3 14 6 0.3 11
lnlinois 61 15 1 2 20 1 0 j 27 j 29 2 2 5 0 14
Indiana 70 13 10.5I 1 17 0.5 0 37 28 1 2 251 2 0.5 6
Twiscs.in 62 9 1 24 0 0 2 12 2 3 16 4 0 13* 1
* This unusually high figure is attributable to Wisconsin's "direct action" statute which permits direct suit
against an insurer; in the typical suit the insurer is joined with the tort-feasor as a party-defendant. See Wisc.
STAT. § 260.11 (1963).
In order to obtain a rough check on the reliability of the statistics
from the reported diversity cases, as compared to those which reached
final judgment but were not reported, a study was made of the diversity
cases filed in the Southern District of Indiana during 1962 and 1963.
5. Since only 7% of the trial court cases and 3% of the appellate
court cases were removed actions, the plaintiff must have chosen the federal forum,
although perhaps with the thought that if he did not so choose, he would be removed
there by the corporate defendant.
6. Of course, the absolute number in each class will be far greater in the state
courts than in the federal courts because of the greater case load in the states.
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For comparison purposes, the docket cases used were those which required
a judicial decision for final judgment.' The docket study results shown
in Table 4 indicate that, numerically, many more cases are filed and pro-
ceed to final judgment than are reported in the reporters. However, in
terms of percentage comparisons there is not such a great disparity be-
tween filed and reported cases.
TABLE 4: Study of Docket of Southern District Indiana
Southern I
District
Indiana Parties Cause of Action
Ic Sioge I Mti I I Ncgligence IContactlotherl
[ Final Judgments 161 121 0I 9I 81 01 2[ 01 01 I[ 7I 'I 0[ 511111 0  21 1[ 4[ 01 3I '!1 .414 O
Reporters Ii IJ i' 106 I~ f43f2
Peretge 1 651 211 11231641 31 5121 0! 41131 41 1  981 0  1 15 15115
1 F. Supp. 1 761 141 0121141121 01 01 01241 0121 1 01141341inal~t JugmC t 5 1 12 101 61 01013121 71 10111111 121 31 3 3 1141 0
II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
PROPOsALS ON THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
The purpose of the present study8 is to determine the practical effect
the American Law Institute's proposals would have upon the workload
of a federal court in regard not only to the number of actions which would
be excluded but also to the subject matter and nature of the actions in-
volved. The question is raised whether the Institute's method of con-
trolling the types of parties is the most fruitful approach to setting stand-
ards for diversity jurisdiction.
The Institute's proposals are a continuation of the present statutory
scheme in the sense that they aim at controlling the types of parties al-
7. Cases which were settled, dismissed by stipulation, or terminated by a consent or
default judgment were omitted from this comparison. It is hard to say that these cases
represent an "interference with state autonomy" since no action at all is taken by the
federal courts; conceivably a different situation is present where final termination re-
quires a decision by the judge.8. The INDIANA LAW JOURNAL wishes to thank the Indianapolis Division of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana and especially the
Clerk of the Court, Mr. Robert Newbold, and his staff for their cooperation in making
available their records so that the information necessary for this study could be obtained.
NOTES
lowed access to the federal courts. The two most far-reaching proposals
are the elimination of all cases originated by residents of the state in
which the suit is brought, regardless of the citizenship of the defendant,9
and the barring of suits brought or removed by a foreign corporation
which has business connections in a state extensive enough to be deemed
to have a "local establishment" there.10
A. Methodology.
A study was made of the civil docket of the Indianapolis Division of
the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana for the fiscal
years 1962 and 1963. The actions included were those instituted during
these two years without regard to the date of final termination.1 The
results are presented according to both the number of actions involved
(Tables 5 through 8) and the subject matter of the actions (Tables 9 and
10) so as to point out the lack of correlation between the two. The tables
show a classification of cases entitled "Non-Resident Corporation-Do-
ing Business in State." This classification is used as the equivalent of
the number of foreign corporation litigants maintaining a "local estab-
9. AmERIcAN LAW INsTiuTE, STUDY OF THE DivIsioN OF JURIsDIcTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERaL COURTS (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1964) (hereafter cited as A.L.I.),
§ 1302(a), 11: "No person can invoke that jurisdiction [diversity], either originally or
on removal in any district in a state of which he is a citizen." Of course under existing
statutes, an in-state defendant cannot remove an action by an out-of-state citizen. See
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
10. A.L.I., § 1302(b), 11:
No corporation incorporated or having its principal place of business in the
United States which has and for a period of more than two years has main-
tained a local establishment in a State can invoke that jurisdiction, either
originally or on removal, in any district in that State in any action related to
the activities of that establishment.
The term "local establishment," as used in this section, means a fixed place
of business where, as a regular part of such business: (1) services are rendered
or accommodations furnished to persons within the State; (2) sales, delivery
or distribution of goods are made to persons within the State by one maintaining
a stock of goods (including a regularly maintained showroom for the display of
samples) within the State; (3) sales of insurance, securities, or other intangibles
are made to persons within the State; or (4) production or processing takes
place. Dealings carried on through a bona fide and independently responsible
commission agent, broker, or custodian do not give rise to a local establishment.
A subsidiary corporation, or a local establishment thereof, does not of itself
constitute a local establishment of its parent corporation.
This section does not apply to partnerships, associations or unincorporated business
entities; the Institute reasons that these loose organizations would cause difficulties in
applying the "local establishment" rule.
11. Not all of the diversity actions instituted during 1962 and 1963 are included.
Several actions were still pending and the files for many of these were in use and not
readily available. As the necessary information was immediately available for a very
high percentage of the actions, it was felt that this was sufficient without further in-
terfering with the court administration.
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lishment" in Indiana. 2 The classifications entitled "Resident Executor,
Administrator, etc." and "Non-Resident Executor, Administrator, etc."
include all actions brought by a representative for a decedent or a third
person.
B. Results.
In Table 5 the original actions are classified according to the type
of plaintiff instituting the action. The removal actions are classified in
Table 6 according to the type of defendant removing from a state court.
These tables show that the exclusionary effect of the A.L.I. changes
would be almost exclusively on resident plaintiffs and non-resident cor-
porations doing business in state, in their status as either plaintiff or
defendant. 8
TABLE 5: Original Diversity Actions
I IExcluded by Per cent of
Total Original Institute's Actions
Plaintiff Actions Proposals Excluded
Resident Individual 43 43 100.0
Non-Resident Individual 57 --
Resident Corporation 6 6 100.0
Non-Resident Corp.-Doing Business in State 33 33 100.0
Non-Resident Corp.-Not Doing Business in State 59 - -
Resident Executor, Administrator, etc. 10 10 100.0
Non-Resident Executor, Administrator, etc. 6 1 16.7
Totals 214 93 43.5
TABLE 6: Removed Diversity Actions
I IExcluded by Per Cent of
Total Removed Institute's Actions
Removed By Actions Proposals Excluded
Non-Resident Individual 11 [ - I -
Non-Resident Corp.-Doing Business in State 1 38 18 1 100.0 I
Non-Resident Corp.-Not Doing Business in State 6 j - I -
Totals 35 18 1 51.4
12. Both the Indianapolis court and the Administrative Office records, which
were used by the Instiute as the basis for their study, show a category of "Non-Resident
Corp.-Doing Business in State." The Institute used this category as an approximation
of the number of corporations maintaining a "local establishment." To save time this
was also done in the present analysis. As pointed out by the Institute, some of these
corporations would not meet the more rigorous test of being "locally established."
A.L.I., App. B at 166. This approximation also assumes that the activities involved are
related to a "local establishment" The effect is to enlarge somewhat the number of
actions excluded by this proposal. However, the Institute points out that general sta-
tistics and an Eastern District of Pennsylvania study show that the approximation is
correct in a very large proportion of the cases. A.L.I. at 167 n.1.
13. The Institute's study estimates that nationally 8,824 out of a total of 15,584,
or 56.6% of the original actions and 2,091 out of 3,406 or 61.4%, of the removal actions
would be excluded.
NOTES
As pointed out in Table 7, in many of the original actions excluded
the defendant would still be eligible to remove if the action were com-
menced against him in a state court. By combining both original and re-
moval actions in Table 8, the effect of the Institute's proposals on the
total diversity actions is shown. Assuming that all original actions ex-
cluded would be removed when the defendant was eligible to do so, 28.9
per cent of the actions would be totally barred from the federal courts.
This is considerably less than the nationwide figure estimated by the
Institute's study. By assuming that every original action excluded would
have been removed, they predict that nationwide 45 per cent of all diver-
sity actions would be barred from federal courts.14
TABLE 7: Original Actions Excluded-Removal If Action Had Been Brought
in State Court
Total j Actions Per Cent of Actions That Prcrcent of
Plaintiff Actions That Could Actions Could Not Actions Not
Excluded Be Removed Removable Be Removed Removable
Resident Individual 43 j 26 60.5 1 17 39.5
Resident Corporation 6 3 50.0 1 3 [ 50.0
Non-Resident Corp.-Doing III
Business in State 33 2 6.1 31 93.9
Resident Executor, Adminis. 10 I I 2
trator, etc. 0 8 80.0 2 20.0
Non-Resident Executor, Ad-I
ministrator, etc. 1 0 - 1 100.0
Totals 1 93 [ 39 [ 41.9 54 58.1
TABLE 8: Effect of The Institute's Proposals on Total Diversity Actions
(Original and Removal)
1 j Total fDiversity ent of Total
Jurisdiction Invoked By j Diversity Actions Actions Actions Not IDiversity Actions
S Actions Excluded Removable Removable Not-Removable I
SResident Individual 43 43 1 26 17 1 39.5 1
Non.Resident Individual 
_ 68 _ - I - - I -
Resident Corporation 
_ 6 6 I 5 I 33 1 _50.0 I
Non-Resident Corp.-Doing I [
Business in State 51 51 2 49 96.1
Non-Resident Corp.-Not - -
Doing Business in State 65 ..
Resident Executor, Admistra- I
tor, etc. 10 10 8 2 20.0
Non-Resident Executor,
Administrator, etc. 6 1" 0 1 16.7
Totals j 249 I111 39 [ 72 21.9 1
* In this case the executrix, a Michigan resident, brought a wrongful death action against an Indiana resident
en behalf of the Indiana decedent. The executrix was decedent's mother. Obviously diversity was not "created"
here, but the action would be excluded by the A.L.I. proposals. See A.L.I., § 1301(b)(3), 8.9.
14. See, A.L.I, App. B at 167.
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Table 9 shows the original actions classified according to the type of
action involved. Table 10 shows the same for removal actions. It can
be seen that there is no correlation between the actions excluded and any
particular subject matter. For example, 52 per cent of the tort actions
would be excluded and 32 per cent of the mortgage foreclosure actions
would be excluded.
TABLE 9: Type of Action-Original
* These actions would be initially excluded by the Institute's proposals, except for the Interpleader Actions.
** All plaintiffs were Non-corporation Business Entities.
f Table 5 shows that one of the actions instituted by a Non-Resident Executor, Administrator, etc., would
be excluded.
TABLE 10: Type of Action-Removal
Tort I
Removed By IPersonal Iniuryl Otbe Insurance Contract Misc. TotalI
Non-Resident Individual 9 - 1 1
Non-Resident Corp.-Doing Business in State 1 13 1 3 1 2 - 18
Non-Resident Corp.-Not Doing Business in State I -- 1 I 1 1 61
Totals 1 22 1 7 1 4 2 351
These two examples raise the question of whether the Institute's
proposal represents the most efficient means of accomplishing the dual
objectives of increasing "state autonomy" and at the same time stream-
NOTES
lining the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. One possible alter-
native to be considered would be adjustment of standards along subject
matter lines.'" From the standpoint of state autonomy, it could be
argued that there is a much stronger state interest in having certain sub-
ject matters within its jurisdiction than in having certain parties within
that jurisdiction. One commentator has pointed out that personal injury
actions are probably the most "local" in nature and have the least national
or interstate impact of all disputes being handled on diversity grounds.1 6
If it is objected that these are the kinds of actions subject to the influence
of local prejudice, it can be pointed out that data collected in a recent
study from the two federal judicial districts in Wisconsin indicate that
fear of local bias is seldom the determining factor in an attorney's choice
of forum in diversity cases.1 7 If there is anything purely "local" in
character in which the state has a nearly exclusive interest, it is the status
of land titles. It seems most haphazard to leave some of the mortgage
foreclosure cases in the federal court while others are returned to the
state courts.
From an administrative standpoint certain questions arise. In the
first place, the exclusion of personal injury actions alone would have re-
duced the workload of the Indianapolis court nearly 33 per cent more
than the Institute's proposals.'8 Furthermore, the fact that 63 per cent of
the removal actions were personal injury suits suggests that under the
Institute's proposals a high percentage of cases excluded and eligible for
removal would have been removed back into the federal court. Thus, the
Institute's proposal might not accomplish much except to add an addi-
tional procedural step to the litigation-removal by the defendant.
The mortgage foreclosure actions also raise doubts about the effi-
ciency of the Institute's approach. The elimination of the 43 remaining
foreclosures would have meant nearly a 20 per cent decrease in the court's
current case load. Since all of these cases were settled either by stipula-
15. Such an approach has 'been suggested by Professor Meador of the University of
Virginia. Meador, A New Approach to Limiting Diversity Jurisdiction, 46 A.B.A.J. 383(1960).
16. Id. at 3.
17. Summers, Anzlysis of Factors That Influence Choice of Forum in Diversity
Cases, 47 IowA L. REv. 933 (1962). And compare similar opinions by federal judges:
Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13
CORNELL L.Q. 499, 521 (1928) ; "Fears of local hostilities had only a speculative existence
in 1789, and are still less real today." Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Juris-
diction, 41 HAav. L. REv. 483, 510 (1928). This same reasoning would apply to most
property damage suits.
18. From Tables 9 and 10 it can be seen that 113 of the 249 actions, or 45.5%,
would have been excluded. Compare this to the 28.9% which would be excluded per-
manently under the Institute's proposals.
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tion or by default, no conceivable prejudice could have harmed the parties
by remitting them to the state courts.'"
The Institute study points out that in many federal districts and in
many state courts there is today no real congestion problem. The longest
delays occur mostly in both federal and state courts in large metropolitan
areas. Thus any relief given to the federal courts would mean an in-
creased burden on the state courts, which are already crowded. But the
Institute goes on to maintain that the added burden on the state courts
would not be serious. They show figures which estimate that if 69 per
cent of the diversity cases tried in the United States District Court for
Massachusetts during the fiscal year 1960 were returned to the Massachu-
setts Superior Court, the state court of general jurisdiction, it would in-
crease the number of Superior Court trials by only 1.6 per cent.2" How
much interference with state autonomy actually exists when the reference
is to cases comprising only 1.6 per cent of the state court caseload? If
an undesirable interference does exist it would seem that it must come
from a particular subject matter that tends to find its way into the federal
system. There might be certain subjects which could more properly be
left in the federal courts than others, but this would never be shown under
the Institute's approach of simply controlling the types of parties al-
lowed access to the federal courts. It seems that before any legislative
changes are adopted to alter diversity jurisdiction, control of the subject
matter and nature of the action should be further considered as a pos-
sible approach to limiting diversity jurisdiction.
19. The eight actions classified as being brought by a "non-resident individual" were
brought by unincorporated business entities and therefore were not excluded by the
A.L.I. proposals. See note 10 supra. However, they were all financial institutions doing
business in the state. There seems to be little justice in treating the same types of
institutions differently on the basis of this difference in form.
20. A.L.I., App. B at 174.
